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Abstract 
Surveillance is often used as a tool in resilience strategies towards the threat posed by terrorist attacks and other se-
rious crime. “Resilience” is a contested term with varying and ambiguous meaning in governmental, business and so-
cial discourses, and it is not clear how it relates to other terms that characterise processes or states of being. Resili-
ence is often assumed to have positive connotations, but critics view it with great suspicion, regarding it as a neo-
liberal governmental strategy. However, we argue that surveillance, introduced in the name of greater security, may 
itself erode social freedoms and public goods such as privacy, paradoxically requiring societal resilience, whether 
precautionary or in mitigation of the harms it causes to the public goods of free societies. This article develops new 
models and extends existing ones to describe resilience processes unfolding over time and in anticipation of, or in 
reaction to, adversities of different kinds and severity, and explores resilience both on the plane of abstract analysis 
and in the context of societal responses to mass surveillance. The article thus focuses upon surveillance as a special 
field for conceptual analysis and modelling of situations, and for evaluating contemporary developments in “surveil-
lance societies”. 
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1. Introduction 
The dramatic revelations made in 2013 by Edward 
Snowden concerned the extensive and intensive sur-
veillance operations of USA and allied intelligence ser-
vices, involving covert collection of communications 
data on a massive scale, with or without clear legal 
warrant and often with the complicity of private com-
munications, computing and media companies 
(Greenwald, 2014). Many of the specific and previously 
top-secret mass surveillance programmes that Snow-
den revealed were shown to be operating on an unim-
aginably huge scale. Increasing public knowledge of 
these practices has stimulated a variety of responses 
from citizens, governments, civil society organisations, 
and other interests. Their views include a search for 
types of response that include opposition, a plea for 
regulation and control, and better ways of shaping the 
relationship between national security and the re-
quirements of liberal democracy. Reactions by privacy 
and Internet activists and advocates, by some parts of 
the media, and by a few politicians and lawyers, have 
been among the most considered, forceful and promis-
ing, with proposed reforming measures ranging from 
the technical to the legal, regulatory and political. 
However, we do not yet possess the conceptual appa-
ratus to model the relationship these disparate means 
of addressing surveillance have to one another, nor to 
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their collective efficacy in the face of the threats posed 
by mass surveillance programmes.1 
Although mass surveillance started well before 
9/11, its rapid expansion since then is often under-
stood as a reaction to the terrorist attacks. Indeed, 
many countries have expanded their counter-terror ac-
tivities over the same time period, and the term “resili-
ence” is often found in official discourses of counter-
terror strategies, as well as serving as an analytical 
term in security studies and other policy areas. It also 
features in popular but vague inspirational language 
that is meant to connote an attitude, or stance, to be 
taken in a wide variety of adverse circumstances. The 
use of this term (along with the related term, “resili-
ent”) has noticeably proliferated in recent years, ap-
plied to a vast array of systems, contexts, processes 
and policies. White and O’Hare (2014), for example, 
found that some 800 official UK policy documents pub-
lished since 2005 contained versions of the term, in-
cluding in the area of counter-terrorism. The properties 
of resilience are considered by policy-makers generally 
to be beneficial, and the aim of making human and 
natural systems resilient taken to be worthy of approv-
al as well as deserving of the allocation of resources. 
Evaluations of individual, group, societal and system 
performance in terms of their resilience have become 
commonplace, and criticism of non-resilience has be-
come justified in the name of improvement. Few would 
wish to be labelled with various possible antonyms: 
brittle, fragile, inflexible, unbending. In sum, the art, 
craft and science of making people and things resilient 
all flourish in the face of threats that may or may not 
be known or predicted.  
Amidst this proliferation, framing theory and policy 
in terms of “resilience” has attracted its critics as well 
as engendered debate. Chandler established the jour-
nal Resilience “to critically engage with the world 
around us, to ask new questions of it” (Chandler, 
2013a). The study of resilience is seen as multidimen-
sional, ambitiously embracing practices, policies, dis-
courses, processes, spaces of construction, economics, 
politics, and subjectivities. The concept “resilience” is 
used almost magnetically to re-orientate the particles 
of diverse fields, disciplines, approaches and substan-
tive research around a new way to frame and compre-
hend their complementarity. Against this initiative, Ne-
ocleous has attacked “resilience” as a project for 
“colonizing the imagination” and making the state and 
capitalism more resilient. It represents an uncritical di-
version from the need for resistance that follows the 
                                                          
1 This article emerges from the IRISS (Increasing Resilience in 
Surveillance Societies) Project (EC Grant Agreement No. 
290492), in which the authors were partners, and which con-
ceived the notion of employing resilience strategies against 
surveillance systems (see http://irissproject.eu/). In this article, 
we develop further an analysis of resilience to surveillance. 
agenda of neoliberalism (Neocleous, 2013a, p. 7; see 
Chandler, 2013b; Neocleous, 2013b). Recent debate 
over the usefulness or, conversely, the danger, of 
adopting a “resilience” approach has taken place in the 
context of international relations discourse, and specif-
ically with reference to liberal intervention to solve a 
range of local and global problems (Chandler, 2015). 
Yet Bourbeau, who notes the proliferation of “resili-
ence” analysis in many fields, observes that in the liter-
ature on world politics, security and “securitisation”, 
“there is very little coherence and consensus as to the 
nature and substance of resilience. The term is em-
ployed but rarely unpacked, let alone theoretically ana-
lysed” (Bourbeau, 2013, p. 3).  
Although the present article is situated broadly 
within the study of security, we do not aim to enter the 
current debate on the plane inhabited by its protago-
nists. Whilst borrowing conceptual elements from 
some of those engaged in the latter, we aim—in Bour-
beau’s terms—to analyse “resilience” theoretically in 
order to use it in the context of surveillance, which we 
believe is a novel application. This is done in order to 
contribute to understanding the effects of surveillance. 
Although surveillance practiced in aid of (national) se-
curity or public safety is indeed a threat to desired and 
desirable personal and social values, we are also scep-
tical about easy assumptions about the reality of a 
“slippery slope” that demands only resistance.  
We thus explore societal resilience to the threats to 
democracies posed by the current mass surveillance of 
communications and other applications of surveillance 
technologies and practices. This exploration is done 
through modelling resilience to surveillance, which also 
embraces “sleepwalking” into a surveillance society 
and “waking up”. Surveillance itself is a resilience tool 
wielded in government policy, used instrumentally—
and discursively justified—to increase collective, indi-
vidual, or infrastructural security against certain 
threats, such as terrorism or breakdowns of public or-
der. However, despite the supposed benefits of surveil-
lance as part of a resilience strategy in the face of 
threats, surveillance’s prevalence, intensity, and use of 
specialised resources including access to personally 
identifiable information may actually erode privacy 
along with a host of other “public goods”: associated 
rights, freedoms, ethical principles, security, and other 
values that it is designed to protect, including democ-
racy itself (Raab, 2012; Raab, 2014). In this erosion, 
surveillance may exemplify the “dark side” of resilience 
(Bourbeau, 2013, p. 4).  
These prospects of threat and response are exam-
ined through the novel visual presentation of possible 
alternative trajectories. The innovation of this portrayal 
rests, however, on the fairly well-established concep-
tion—that we share with others (see Bourbeau, 2013, 
p. 7)—of resilience as process and not only as a label 
for a set of qualities or properties of an individual, 
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group, or society deemed to be “resilient”. The theo-
retical possibilities outlined by these trajectories em-
brace all the engineering, ecological, and socio-
ecological subtypes of resilience sketched by Bourbeau 
(2013, p. 9, Table 1), and as such, rather than rely on a 
singular definition of resilience, we present resilience 
as an overarching term within which the different sub-
types may come into play. Turning the tables on the 
construction of surveillance as resilience to a conven-
tional array of threats to security and safety, the article 
also further develops the argument that the practices 
and policies of resilience can be used against surveil-
lance itself, exploring how societies may remain demo-
cratic in the face of what some writers have described 
as the deeply negative impacts that surveillance prac-
tices otherwise might have (e.g., Lyon, 2003a, 2003b; 
Čas et al., 2015; Raab et al., 2015; see also Wright & 
Kreissl, 2015). 
Whilst privacy is the value, right, or public good 
most frequently said to be implicated in the employ-
ment of surveillance for national security or public 
safety, we do not assume that “privacy” has a singular, 
easily grasped, consensual meaning. It is commonplace 
in the literature on privacy to construe it as a cluster or 
“family” of values (e.g., Solove, 2008) that are prized 
for a variety of instrumental or intrinsic reasons, and 
that may be differently implicated in different norm-
related contexts (Nissenbaum, 2010). There are several 
discernable types of privacy, each associated with one 
or more relatively distinctive principles, rights or free-
doms, including dignity, autonomy, freedom of expres-
sion, and several others that form part of the familiar 
canon of individual rights and public goods inherent in 
liberal democracy (Wright & Raab, 2014). Our analysis 
of what is at stake in the deployment of surveillance 
embraces, in general terms, any or all of these. There is 
no space presently to disaggregate this understanding 
and to discuss each among the variety of public goods; 
we highlight the consequences of surveillance for pri-
vacy and security because these are the values that are 
most prominent in current discourse and policy.  
The central arguments of this article are that the 
concept of resilience can usefully be applied to the 
study of surveillance; that resilience cannot be as-
sumed to happen, and may in fact fail; that several dif-
ferent outcomes are indeed possible; that the dia-
grammatic approach we demonstrate usefully offers a 
way of incorporating different subtypes of resilience 
(e.g., “bouncing back”) within a unified umbrella 
framework; and that our diagrammatic approach facili-
tates the representation and modelling of different 
scenarios and outcomes. The article’s argument devel-
ops in three steps: it (1) refers to some existing models 
of resilience and abstracts them from their specific 
previous contexts before (2) developing a more varied 
and general model of resilience. It then (3) applies this 
specifically to the topic of surveillance. 
2. Resilience: Some Examples in Discourse and 
Practice 
The concept of “resilience” is identified in all kinds of 
natural and social phenomena where threats to integri-
ty and identity are faced by physical objects, social 
goods and ethical values, or social relationships. Persis-
tence and change are the resultant and alternative 
states of a host of small or large measures taken in re-
sponse to, or in anticipation of, the challenges that are 
posed, although whether something is deemed to have 
persisted or changed—and how much—is not neces-
sarily objectively determined: it is often a matter of 
subjective perception and conventional agreement or 
disagreement. This is a generic problem in the analysis 
of system change or persistence, and is inherent in, for 
example, the understanding, within policy studies, of 
incremental (or intra-structural) and large (or funda-
mental and structural) change (Braybrooke & Lind-
blom, 1963, p. 62 and Chapter 4).  
Nevertheless, while “resilience” is held to be a 
widely-applicable concept, its meaning as well as the 
practical measures it indicates are disparate. The latter 
point in different ways to the means of protecting, de-
tecting, and responding to the consequences of 
threats, attacks, disasters and other adverse events. 
We do not attempt to define the term precisely, alt-
hough some of its most important connotations are 
germane to our further analysis and are conveyed in 
section 4. Some examples of resilience, threat or attack 
in different contexts and domains can be found in offi-
cial documents, and are briefly indicated here. Docu-
mentary materials drawn from UK government de-
partments include emergency planning (UK Cabinet 
Office, 2013), cyber security (UK Cabinet Office, 
2011a), community resilience (UK Cabinet Office, 
2011b), and counter-terrorism strategy (UK Home Of-
fice, 2011). Some UN documents concern global sus-
tainability and development (United Nations Secretary-
General’s High-level Panel on Global Sustainability, 
2012), disaster risk reduction (UN System Task Team 
on the Post-2015 UN Development Agenda, 2012), 
pandemics and health (Ban, 2009), human rights 
(Yusuf, 2012), counter-terrorism (UN Security Council, 
Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTED), 2013), and 
crime-prevention (UN Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs/Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice, 2010). Several points can be derived from this 
very selective canvass: 
  “Resilience” is sometimes undefined but refers to 
a coherent set of objectives and implementation 
measures in the face of human and natural 
threats to vital interests such as national security, 
food supply and community functioning. 
 The resilience strategy relies upon planned, co-
ordinated efforts across organisations at different 
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levels, and among participants with defined roles 
and responsibilities.  
  “Resilience” enjoys a certain political appeal, 
possibly because the term suggests strength, ro-
bustness and fortitude. 
  “Resilience” is also attractive to administrators, 
perhaps because it involves skills in problem analy-
sis, strategic planning, and policy implementation.  
 The meaning of “resilience” requires interpretive 
skills because it is not always evident, although its 
connotation may be clear in terms of strategy and 
practical measures; however, “resilience to sur-
veillance” is more elusive. 
 Even when the term is not explicitly used, it re-
mains possible to construct a plausible scenario 
that identifies the threat, what is threatened, and 
how the threat can be countered through preven-
tive or remedial measures. 
 Preventative and preparedness measures—not 
the same thing—loom large across fields where 
threats or adverse events vary in terms of their 
inevitability, and therefore in the nature and dy-
namics of resilience.  
Most of the uses of the term are with regard to nation-
al or community security and safety in the face of natu-
ral or man-made disasters and threats in some near or 
far future, or with regard to strategies for economic 
and social development. In some examples, the use of 
surveillance, including monitoring or other means of in-
formation gathering and social control, is considered to 
be part of a resilience policy or strategy.  
A further relevant observation points up a distinc-
tion between resilience as a property of a society, 
community or an individual, and resilience as the activ-
ities undertaken to bounce back or to anticipate some 
threat. For example, it is possible to distinguish be-
tween two different meanings of the term “community 
resilience”. The first is the kind of localised planning 
and contingency measures often encouraged by gov-
ernment as a means for localities to cope with sudden 
adverse environmental conditions or terrorist attacks, 
and to work alongside “first responders”. The second 
kind is the more intrinsic or “organic” quality of psy-
chological or community social solidarity evident in re-
sponse to certain adverse events, suggesting that far 
from being fractured by the adverse event, individual 
psyches and communal bonds are resilient to damage 
and may even be part of a wider community-rebuilding 
process (see also Hall & Lamont, 2013a).  
Various theories may be found in the social scienc-
es—for example, sociology and criminology—to ac-
count for communal “organic” resilience. For example, 
Durkheim (1984 [1893], pp. 53-67) famously character-
ises fundamental societal ties in terms of “social soli-
darity”, comprised both of social-economic interde-
pendence on others and of shared moral values. More 
recently, Putnam (2000) has sought to explain why cer-
tain places or regions display greater civic vibrancy, ar-
guing that factors such as social networks (and volun-
tary associations in particular) build trust and links 
between local people, and Sampson (2008) has argued 
that the concept of “collective efficacy” can explain 
how mutual local support may be used to achieve par-
ticular collective goals. In each case, these theorists 
have sought to explain empirical differences in social 
cohesion, both between different places and over time, 
finding that such cohesion is by no means inevitable. 
While community resilience is often assumed to be de-
sirable, its capabilities could be used by government as 
a pretext for transferring responsibility for contingency 
management to the local level, and could even perhaps 
induce communities to learn to withstand events or 
situations that they should not have to tolerate (see al-
so Walklate & Mythen, 2015, Chapter 6). 
We now highlight at greater length a contrasting 
example—the study of dictatorial and post-dictatorial 
regimes—that relates to an overtly “political” context 
rather than one concerning natural or man-made disas-
ters or law-enforcement. Here the focus is upon how, 
and to what extent, societies show signs of resilience in 
relation to the exercise of political power and the dis-
tribution of resources. In this illustration, “resilience” 
becomes more easily seen as neither necessarily a 
“good thing” nor necessarily a “pro-security” concept. 
Similarly, Bourbeau (2013, pp. 7-8, 10) refers to resili-
ence’s undesirable “dark side” and its dependency on 
context; Marx (2015, p. 16) makes a similar argument in 
relation to “resistance” and to “security” in general. See-
ing these regimes in transformation also brings to light 
concrete developments that will be exemplified on a 
more abstract and conceptual level later in this article. 
In the Soviet era in East and Central Europe, the 
wide range of political regimes experienced periods of 
change from dictatorship through transitional phases 
leading towards forms of democratic system. This 
transformation brings into view a tension between the 
political regime and the society, casting light on differ-
ent meanings and manifestations of “resilience”: socie-
tal resilience towards the dictatorial system, and the 
resilience of dictatorial systems themselves towards 
political and societal changes and towards external in-
ternational pressure. Citizens, groups and institutions 
developed a resilience capability towards changes at 
various levels.  
At the individual level, for example, families from 
the pre-war upper middle class kept their large flats if 
they formally accepted expropriation and nationalisa-
tion of the flats and formally registered co-tenants who 
had never actually lived there. Another resilience strat-
egy of certain educated families was to commission 
forged paintings of famous painters from skilful local 
artists, since preserving and storing artworks acknowl-
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edged as part of the cultural assets of the county, for 
the preserving and storing of which the state galleries 
had no space, made them eligible for possessing an ex-
tra room in their flats. Tolerance shown to dissident 
groups and their samizdat (clandestine) publications 
contributed to resilience of the system and its citizens. 
For citizens who accepted the regime, family life and 
personal economy were developed through small-scale 
semi-private enterprise and informal economic net-
works. Those in opposition in underground movements 
developed resilience through a variety of means. In ad-
dition, the degree of a regime’s repressiveness, and its 
use of ubiquitous surveillance in the era of the Stasi, 
the Securitate and similar organisations shaped oppo-
nents’ behaviour and resilience. These and other char-
acteristics enabled the regimes to reduce national and 
international tensions, to adapt to changing environ-
ments, and to resist shock-like impacts. 
In the period of democratic transformation, the 
“Velvet Revolution” (Czechoslovakia) or the “rule-of-
law revolution” of 1989 (Hungary) can be seen in terms 
of structural resilience that retained the legal and ad-
ministrative framework. There is a strong tradition of 
resilient personal survival through social and political 
influence spanning transitional regime changes. Mem-
bers of the former political and economic elite retained 
their influence by taking over state-owned companies, 
and the discredited secret services soon reconsolidated 
themselves. Even where their leaders were replaced 
with trustworthy pro-democratic people, many per-
sonnel remained in office, together with their organisa-
tional culture, and adapted to the changing environ-
ment. In some countries in the post-dictatorial period 
(e.g., Hungary), new organisations, the enforceability 
of individual rights and freedoms, and the capitalist 
economy created a window for the establishment of 
new institutions and international relationships. How-
ever, it is not clear whether the resilience of all social 
strata has persisted and become stronger. Some new 
democratic political organisations proved vulnerable 
and short-lived. Trade unions became marginalised, 
and the position and living standards of the unskilled 
and the intellectuals declined.  
Societal resilience specifically towards surveillance 
in the post-dictatorship era also deserves attention. Af-
ter the changes, the fear of the regime was replaced by 
a fear of crime. Societies under long authoritarian rule 
have virtually skipped the period of democratic moder-
nity and jumped directly into the surveillance culture of 
postmodernity (Los, 2002). The lack of historical expe-
rience resulted in increased vulnerability and de-
creased resilience towards new forms and technologies 
of surveillance, as individuals became more susceptible 
to business and marketing offers and industry-driven 
surveillance (Szekely, 2008). In those former dictatorial 
regimes where personal and family life were more resili-
ent, and although private surveillance was not conceived 
as potentially harmful, suspicion against state surveil-
lance remained high. 
The lessons learnt from this non-democratic and 
transitional context are that: 
 In the perspective of democracy, a resilient dicta-
torship, in which non-democratic forms of political 
life and the careers of privileged elites may be able 
to survive shocks and defeats, is clearly not 
“good”, whereas civil-societal resistance ( “resili-
ence”) to the dictatorship’s surveillance strategy 
appears politically desirable. 
 The general question, “is resilience desirable?” is 
therefore germane in any example.  
 More generally, it is important to look at the pas-
sage of historical time in analysing the sequences 
of adverse events and responses in order to con-
ceptualise resilience as a trajectory. 
All the above illustrations show the diversity of resili-
ence practices and meanings in different contexts. Our 
argument here is (1) that resilience has become a ma-
jor theme in UK and UN government policy today, par-
ticularly in relation to security matters; (2) that there 
are various political dimensions to this; and (3) that 
whatever one’s political evaluation of how resilience is 
operating in a given area, the twin policy themes of (a) 
assessing the “amount” of resilience present and (b) 
seeking to increase this through developing better pro-
cesses seem very powerful from a policy-making per-
spective. 
Before we focus upon the domain of surveillance as 
the set of specific events and practices towards which 
resilience may be oriented, we first explore the theo-
retical grounding of the concept of resilience and lo-
cate our own efforts within its literature. 
3. Theoretical Underpinning of “Resilience” 
The concept of “resilience” has certain linkages with 
conceptual and theoretical writing on general systems 
and cybernetics—based on the analysis of communica-
tion and control—that discuss natural and social pro-
cesses involving changes of state or restoration over 
time, threats to existing states of affairs, and/or inter-
actions between actors and the “world” they seek to 
change or regulate. There is only space here to draw 
attention to the heuristic value of such conceptual 
frameworks for deriving points or questions that may 
be useful in the analysis of resilience. 
General systems theory posits the notion of a sys-
tem and its environment, and analyses the relationship 
between parts of a system, their contribution to the 
whole, and the relationship of the system to its envi-
ronment(s) (Demerath & Peterson, 1967; Deutsch, 
1963; Easton, 1965; Emery, 1969; Parsons, 1951; Wie-
ner, 1954). Changes can be generated internally to a 
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system or as an effect of its environment. Central to 
such theory are concepts such as equilibrium, stability, 
homeostasis, and the normal states of systems in 
terms of their internal organisation or in relation to 
their environments. Systems theory and cybernetics 
are replete with themes and concepts of organisation 
and disorganisation, the degradation (entropy) and re-
inforcement of states of being, adaptation, stability 
and instability, order and chaos, flexibility and rigidity, 
communication, information and control, self-
organisation and feedback, and many more. They pro-
vide a conceptual language for talking about how sys-
tems maintain themselves, change, grow or die; all 
these states are relevant to an understanding of resili-
ence. Perhaps even more difficult—and interesting—to 
analyse are cases where a system becomes utterly 
transformed into something “new”; the dictatorial and 
post-dictatorial example may be seen in this light. The 
application of systems thinking to human affairs is typi-
cally done not only to describe social or political phe-
nomena, but to contribute prescriptively to change and 
improvement in the latter in accordance with ideals and 
values that are, of course, themselves open to debate.  
A system may not only react to environmental ef-
fects by changing its internal properties or organisa-
tion, but also act on and change its environment, bring-
ing about a new relationship or a new equilibrium. 
Several “resilience” authors suggest this, and their ob-
servations are germane to current attempts to clarify 
the concept and make it relevant to contemporary de-
bate and practical application, as we shall see. Holling, 
a leading theorist of ecological resilience, calls the two 
approaches “analytical” and “integrative” (Holling, 
1998). White and O’Hare (2014) distinguish between 
“equilibrist” and “evolutionary” resilience; Longstaff’s 
(2005, p. 27) similar distinction is between “engineer-
ing” (status quo maintenance) and “ecological” (state 
change) resilience; and Taleb’s (2013) is between “anti-
fragile” and “resilience”. In the business context, Ha-
mel and Välikangas’s (2003) terms are “strategic resili-
ence”, involving “continuous anticipation”, and 
“dynamic reinvention”. More pessimistically, Walker 
and Salt (2006) note that “complex adaptive systems 
can…have more than one ‘stable state’”; depleted fish 
stocks may not be resilient enough to recover (p. 36); 
and change may be slow and unnoticed (p. 10). Feible-
man and Friend’s (1945) comprehensive framework en-
ables the location of resilience within a variety of stanc-
es that relate to the nature of the systems that respond 
to environmentally induced changes or stimuli.  
In these approaches, outcomes may be achieved 
through processes that include communication, flows 
of information, learning (Deutsch, 1963) and aware-
ness of the entity’s internal state and of the configura-
tion of its environment, and by means of instruments 
for discovering and for affecting salient parts of the ex-
ternal world (Hood, 1983). These may all be seen as 
part of a repertoire for being resilient in the face of 
threats, whether by anticipating and avoiding these 
risks or by responding when they occur. We cannot ful-
ly explore these processes here, or relate them sys-
tematically to resilience to surveillance. However, 
drawing upon such constructs and concepts helps in 
generating and answering important questions about 
the resilience of a social system—including its demo-
cratic values and practices—to adverse events, wheth-
er these be external or internally generated ones such 
as are posed by systems of mass surveillance. 
Relating to the points derived from the examples 
described earlier, many questions could be posed, in-
viting deeper development of resilience strategies, and 
illustrating the way in which theoretical and conceptual 
analysis affords a purchase on the kinds of processes 
that are of particular interest to us in focusing upon the 
threat posed by the mass surveillance of communica-
tions in particular. However, space permits only a few 
basic questions here; these are prompted by high-level 
approaches but are deliberately re-orientated towards 
the political and social frame of reference in which we 
seek to analyse resilience phenomena. The current 
questions include:  
 What analogies can be drawn from the processes 
of threat and responses in other concrete systems 
in order to model surveillance-resilient processes? 
 Is the threat carried out suddenly or incrementally?  
 What “constitutive public goods” are at risk in lib-
eral-democratic societies, and what sustains 
them?  
 Do resilient adaptations result in the maintenance 
or restoration of pre-surveillance levels of public 
goods, or is a new equilibrium established at low-
er or higher levels? 
Further questions—not considered here—would include: 
 How vulnerable are these public goods to the 
threat of surveillance? 
 Can we describe, in equilibrium terms, the rela-
tionship between a liberal democratic society and 
the state(s) in its environment? 
 How much (and what forms) of surveillance 
threaten what public goods? 
 How severe is the threat, and what public goods-
sustaining social and political processes and func-
tions are threatened? 
 What is the society’s degree of flexibility and its 
potentiality to adopt one or another response to 
external threats? 
 How does the system (i.e. society) learn about the 
potential threats to its public goods, processes or 
functions? 
 Can democratic societies take anticipatory action 
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to prevent these threats from occurring or to mit-
igate their likely effect? 
 What are the internal (re-)organisational and re-
source prerequisites to anticipatory and self-
organising activity to prevent or mitigate threats? 
 Does such action include only internal change in 
culture, structure and behaviour, or does it also 
include efforts to inhibit surveillance at source? 
4. Modelling Resilience 
We have already observed that there is now a sizeable 
and growing literature on resilience, featuring various 
definitions, though also some common conceptual lan-
guage (Clarke, 2013). A document on food security de-
fines it as “the capacity of agricultural development to 
withstand or recover from stresses and shocks and thus 
bounce back to the previous level of growth” (The 
Montpellier Panel, 2012, p. 11). Cognisant of that docu-
ment, another one in the same field says, more general-
ly: “Resilience is the ability of an individual, a household, 
a community, a country or a region to withstand, to 
adapt, and to quickly recover from stresses and shocks” 
(European Commission, 2012, p. 5). It continues: 
The concept of resilience has two dimensions: the 
inherent strength of an entity—an individual, a 
household, a community or a larger structure—to 
better resist stress and shock and the capacity of 
this entity to bounce back rapidly from the im-
pact….It requires a multifaceted strategy and a 
broad systems perspective […and] calls for a long-
term approach (European Commission, 2012, p. 5; 
emphasis in original). 
Within academic literature, Chandler (2012, p. 217), for 
example, has defined resilience as “the capacity to pos-
itively or successfully adapt to external problems or 
threats”. Writing from a more psychological perspec-
tive, Luthar, Cicchetti and Becker have similarly defined 
resilience as “a dynamic process encompassing positive 
adaptation within the context of significant adversity” 
(Luthar et al., 2000, p. 543; cited in Bourbeau, 2013, p. 
7). Hall and Lamont (2013b, p. 13) define “social resili-
ence” as “an outcome in which the members of a 
group sustain their well-being in the face of challenges 
to it”. There has been some debate, however, as to 
what the nature of all these forms of resilience adapta-
tion might be.  
References above to the work of White and O’Hare 
(2014) and to Longstaff (2005) showed that one way to 
understand the nature of “resilience”, and to distinguish 
between different kinds of resilience, is to consider 
whether the system reverts back to the status quo or 
instead changes to a new state. Similarly, the colloquial 
term “bouncing back” is often used to capture a quality 
of resilience, connoting recovery to the prior state of 
“normality”. However, as Folke (2006, p. 259) has ar-
gued, resilience may also involve evolution towards a 
“new normality” or perhaps a new equilibrium, com-
prehensible in terms of the theoretical underpinning 
discussed above, and which one might term “bouncing 
forward”. In a variant of the twofold distinction, Bour-
beau (2013, p. 8) draws a threefold but perhaps broad-
ly similar distinction, namely between engineering 
(equilibrist) resilience, ecological resilience (system 
continuity), and socio-ecological (emergent or adap-
tive) resilience. He then goes on to suggest a revised 
threefold distinction, namely between “resilience as 
maintenance”, resilience as “marginal adjustments”, 
and resilience as “renewal” or “remodelling” (2013, p. 
12). Bourbeau consequently defines resilience “as the 
process of patterned adjustments adopted by a society 
or an individual in the face of endogenous or exoge-
nous shocks” (2013, p. 10). Additionally, and presuma-
bly in order to distinguish the analysis of the workings 
of resilience from resilience itself, he proposes the new 
term “resiliencism”, which he defines as “a conceptual 
framework for understanding how continuity and 
transformation take place under these circumstances” 
(2013, p. 10; see also Bourbeau, 2015a).  
Another way of approaching the question of how 
best to define or characterise “resilience” is to identify 
the various different strategies or techniques it typical-
ly employs. An interesting feature of resilience strate-
gies is that they seem to involve a combination of for-
ward-looking measures attempting “to anticipate, 
prepare for, and, as far as possible, avoid the worst ex-
cesses of the next disruption” (Cho, Willis, & Stewart-
Weeks, 2011); measures, such as resistance, designed 
to combat current events; and learning, recovery or 
change measures in response to adverse events that 
have already occurred. Moreover, it is clear that we 
need to distinguish between resilience as a strategy 
and resilience as a description of empirical reality. Fur-
thermore, we agree with Bourbeau that, especially in 
relation to the second of these, rather than imagine re-
silience as being wholly effective or ineffective, it 
makes more sense to consider it as a matter of degree. 
In a subsequent section, we explore these various ele-
ments further and propose a framework within which 
various scenarios can be modelled, including ones that 
are not normally entertained in discussions of resili-
ence, namely where it fails. Before that, however, we 
turn to a brief discussion of the differences but also the 
relationships between resilience and resistance. 
4.1. Resilience and Resistance 
Resilience is not a one-off performance, but a sustained 
and systematic process that includes capacity-building 
institutional and procedural development. It partly over-
laps with “resistance”, an important but relatively unex-
amined concept in surveillance studies, involving indi-
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vidual and group opposition, protest, and defensive 
measures, but is a quite different process and not syn-
onymous with it (on the issue of “resisting surveillance”, 
see Bennett, 2008; Fernandez & Huey, 2009; Introna & 
Gibbons, 2009; Lyon, 2003b; Martin, Brakel, & Bernhard, 
2009; Sanchez, 2009; Wells & Wills, 2009; Wright & 
Kreissl, 2015). In relation to the opposition to surveil-
lance, privacy and other human-rights advocates might 
ask why the adoption of “resilience” terminology and 
frameworks should be preferred over existing discourses 
and strategies involving “resourcefulness”, “risk man-
agement” and, in particular, “resistance”. Evans and 
Reid (2013) lament the conflation of “resilience” and 
“resistance”. They abhor the de-politicisation of “resili-
ence” in which individuals are exhorted to abandon re-
sistance and to adapt to, rather than to oppose or politi-
cally transform, situations of insecurity and adversity. 
They see this as a “nihilistic” capitulation to liberal re-
gimes that thrive on the insecurity of others.  
Although we do not share these authors’ confi-
dence in “resistance” as the preferred stance, we fully 
acknowledge the many overlaps and linkages between 
it and “resilience”. However, we seek to demonstrate 
that the conceptual and practical apparatus of resili-
ence identifies various discrete components that might 
also inform future resistance strategies; it offers a dis-
tinctive holistic approach of a kind not always readily 
captured in the notion of “resistance”. Moreover, in 
some languages, “resilience” does not have a straight-
forward equivalent. But even where there exist sepa-
rate terms for resilience and resistance, actions aimed 
at withstanding shock-like adverse events can have a 
resistant and resilient aspect alike. According to popu-
lar conception, resistance can be associated with a rigid 
entity that undertakes an aggressive or even counter-
striking action to defend itself, while resilience may 
evoke more flexibility, as systems theory indicates. In 
many cultures, and in the history of oppressed peoples, 
heroism demands resistance. In other cultures and 
movements, “passive resistance” or “turning the other 
cheek” are the principled and valued responses. Some-
times, there may be a dramatic choice.  
At a general level, although both notions incorpo-
rate elements of prediction and prevention, resistance 
can be seen as a response that concentrates on the 
present; tries to avoid changes and preserve the exist-
ing state; emphasises the political dimension of the 
struggle; and sometimes uses radical solutions such as 
pre-emptive strikes or self-destruction. Resilience, on 
the other hand, refers to a broader and sometimes 
more bureaucratic range of measures deployed to try 
to cope with changes, and that may learn from the past 
and plan for the future as well as deal with the present. 
Thus the resilient entity is not only able to recover but 
also to develop ways to exist within adverse circum-
stances, and also to prevent future adversity. 
Bourbeau (2015b, pp. 17-18) has recently suggest-
ed a further way in which resilience and resistance, 
while different, are interrelated, namely that the ca-
pacity to resist, especially on an on-going basis, might 
be thought to require some resilience capability as a 
prerequisite for success. For example, the capability to 
mount resistance strategies could be seen as reflective 
of an entity exhibiting resilience; and the ability to 
withstand and bounce back from the likely setbacks in-
volved in a resistance struggle also seem “resilience-
like”. Lastly, a successful resistance measure may even 
lead to a new state of affairs, or “bouncing forward”. 
The question of process also points towards resili-
ence’s inclusion of a learning component, another 
complex matter to be explored. It is one of the steps in 
a temporal sequence that is recommended for building 
resilience in a specific domain such as agricultural de-
velopment, and in wider policy discourse. This includes 
activities to anticipate, survey, prevent, tolerate, recov-
er, restore and learn. As we will soon see, a resilience 
model used in the agricultural development field 
(Conway, Waage, & Delaney, 2010, p. 309) is helpful 
because it neatly summarises the content of resilience 
processes and offers a dramatic visual representation 
of what may typically take place over time. Other 
terms used in the agricultural setting are withstand, re-
sist, handle, absorb, adapt, response, resume, optimise, 
innovate, reconstruct, renew, and persist. In the field of 
disaster-reduction, the concept of vulnerability is also 
important: “[t]he conditions determined by physical, 
social, economic, and environmental factors or pro-
cesses, which increase the susceptibility of a communi-
ty to the impact of hazards” (International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction (ISDR), 2004, p. 16). 
Armed with such process-related terms, it is possi-
ble to model an approach to resilience to surveillance 
drawing upon such terminology to depict a continuous 
process embracing: 
 anticipatory, preventive measures to mitigate the 
harms that may be brought about through surveil-
lance;  
 measures to absorb, resist or withstand the 
threats posed by surveillance; and  
 post-event measures to recover and to learn how 
better to anticipate and/or to cope with harmful 
surveillance.  
How the concepts are configured into relationships and 
sequences is a crucial question that will be sketched 
later on, but the details of this must be left for another 
time. Whilst these high-level concepts apply generically 
to situations of resilience, it is necessary to develop 
models that correspond closely to the circumstances of 
the different domains of application, but—again—
detailed demonstration must be deferred. For exam-
ple, some of these domains afford greater possibilities 
of anticipation and prevention than do others, and the 
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part played in resilience respectively by society and by 
state institutions will also vary. 
4.2. The First Step: Identifying the Components of 
Resilience 
In this section, we explore some different sequences of 
adverse events and system responses, in order to high-
light various possible outcomes in which a system does 
or does not exhibit resilience. Our discussion begins by 
taking a model from a particular domain, then general-
ising it, before considering its applicability to the ques-
tion of societal responses to mass surveillance systems 
specifically. We use a series of diagrams to help illus-
trate the processes at work. 
The heuristic diagram in Figure 1, drawn from work 
on agricultural development (Conway et al., 2010, Fig-
ure 9.9), shows a simple resilience sequence. 
We will supersede this diagram with ones that con-
sider surveillance as the disruptive phenomenon, but it 
is useful to refer to it and its definitions in showing the 
general, cross-domain conceptualisation of resilience—
involving both preparedness and response2—and the 
part played by the concepts “stress” and “shock”. In 
this construct, “stress” is defined as “a regular, some-
times continuous, relatively small and predictable dis-
turbance”, and a “shock” as “an irregular, relatively 
large and unpredictable disturbance” (The Montpellier 
Panel, 2012, p. 11), although it would be advisable to 
disaggregate each definition in order to show differ-
ences in size, predictability and continuity. The terms 
                                                          
2 Conway et al. (2010) identify and diagram a further important 
element, “countermeasures”, representing the deployment of 
measures to address the negative consequences of stresses or 
shocks that have become apparent (Figure 9.8). The effective-
ness of countermeasures is not assumed, and subsequent sce-
narios, for better or worse, can then be sketched. 
indicated in the x-axis, from “anticipate” to “learn”, 
signify different activities that are important in resili-
ence, albeit not necessarily in a clear sequence. 
However, as this diagram derives from a develop-
mental context, the expectation of a rising slope, espe-
cially as the target for recovery, cannot be simply 
transposed to a model tailored to a surveillance-and-
human-rights context, because it is not obvious that 
rights protections can be confidently expected, or 
planned, to improve steadily over time. Similarly, from 
the perspective of surveillance and rights, the upward 
slope may indicate an ambiguity, namely whether the 
model represents an ideal (that it is desirable for “de-
velopment” to increase over time) or whether it pur-
ports to represent reality, albeit abstractly (that societies 
typically are developing over time). Usefully, the dia-
gram does not show only the course of a relatively sim-
ple “bounce-back”, perhaps through some meandering, 
to the trajectory of development, but also envisages 
possibilities of indefinitely longer drift to lower levels 
where loss—de-development—replaces recuperation; in 
other words, the system has failed to be resilient. 
We particularly recognise the potential of the con-
cept of “resilience” to become, as Béné, Godfrey Wood, 
Newsham and Davies (2012) put it, a “form of integrat-
ing discourse” able to rally an “increasing number of 
people, institutions, and organisations under its banner, 
as it creates communication bridges and platforms be-
tween disciplines and communities of practices, and of-
fers common grounds on which dialogue can then be ini-
tiated between organisations, departments or ministries 
which had so far very little, or no history of collabora-
tion” (p. 12). Such bridges and platforms are crucial to 
countering the detrimental effects of surveillance, en-
suring effective respect for public goods and at the same 
time protecting people and communities. 
 
Figure 1. Agricultural development model of resilience. Note: A similar diagram was used in IRISS Deliverable 6.1, and 
was adapted from The Montpellier Panel (2012, p. 11). 
 Media and Communication, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 2, Pages 21-41 30 
4.3. The Second Step: Developing and Exploring the Re-
silience Framework 
With this in mind, we take further steps in the direction 
of resilience to surveillance by means of revised mod-
els. Figure 2 depicts two axes: public goods, and time. 
The x-axis is re-labelled “time” because this makes ex-
plicit what is implicit in the original model, namely that 
the diagram represents a temporal flow, and that its 
constituent elements (anticipate, survey, etc.) may be 
thought of as associated with different moments in re-
lation to the stress or shock event. The y-axis is re-
labelled “public goods”, in order to generalise the 
model’s applicability. Loader and Walker (2007, p. 145) 
argue that an expanded concept of “public good” can 
usefully be applied to the study of security by including 
not only shared societal goods such as liberty or free-
dom of expression, but additionally, by seeing such a 
good as a “constitutive public good”; that is, a societal 
good understood as an integral and essential element 
of society itself. We contend that this expanded con-
cept can similarly be applied to the study of resilience 
in general, as well as to privacy in particular when it is 
threatened by, for example, “national security” surveil-
lance. Public goods can refer to any “good” of potential 
fundamental benefit, but here we are particularly in-
terested in goods relating to freedoms, liberties, rights, 
democracy, security and privacy: the ones that are typ-
ically impacted by surveillance. A further advantage of 
using the term “public goods” is that it can refer both 
to their realisation in practice, and the vigour with 
which they are valued as societal values. 
In Figure 3 we introduce a new element, the “ideal 
level” of the desire for, vis-à-vis the “real level” of pub-
lic goods. We represent here the ideal level (i.e., how 
much a public good is desired or valued by society) as a 
horizontal line, hypothesising an ideal Western consti-
tutional democracy where the desired level of public 
goods is constant. We also label the three scenarios 
represented in the original model (full recovery, partial 
recovery, and non-recovery). 
As noted above, while there are some similarities 
between the concepts of “resistance” and “resilience”, 
there are also important differences. Our revised model 
enables us to illustrate this distinction through a sepa-
rate abstract model for resistance, which helps to distin-
guish it from the various cases of resilience (Figure 4). 
Whereas Figures 1–3 model resilience in the face of 
the occurrence of a single major event, Figure 5 models 
resilience both in the face of incremental, “creeping” 
threats to public goods, as well as in relation to a single 
major event or a small but culminating event that 
“breaks the camel’s back”. Figure 5 thus better models 
resilience in relation to surveillance, in which surveil-
lance threats may be incremental and gradual, or sud-
den and dramatic, although these properties are not 
unique to surveillance as a threat. It should be noted, 
therefore, that the model in Figure 5 is a general one, 
potentially also applicable to the threats to security 
that give rise to surveillance. It is possible to make ad-
vances on this diagram through other ones that depict 
further dimensions of resilience to surveillance, and 
that highlight other important considerations and 
questions about the path of resilience that pertain not 
only to the surveillance context but to others as well. 
 
Figure 2. Relabelled Conway diagram. 
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Figure 3. Modified resilience model. 
 
Figure 4. Resistance towards stresses and shocks. 
 
Figure 5. Resilience towards repeated stresses and shocks. Note: An earlier version was used in IRISS Deliverable 6.1. 
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In the case of security or agricultural development, 
stresses or shocks are often modelled as sudden major 
shock events, for example, a terrorist attack or famine. 
However, in the case of surveillance, measures intro-
duced that have a deleterious effect on civic society, 
such as a “chilling effect” on political debate or free-
dom of assembly, need not be singular or sudden, but 
may instead be smaller but more sustained. Conse-
quently, this diagram incorporates an additional resili-
ence scenario, showing a series of stresses, each one 
followed by an episode of resilience, which in the par-
adigm case restores the public good in question to its 
prior state, although of course full restoration need not 
be the case. The diagram also shows a final stress or 
shock—whether small or large—that has a larger effect 
on public goods, so that resilience has a more uncer-
tain outcome and may take longer. As in agricultural 
development, the uncertainty of the outcome is shown 
by the top line following the “final” stress or shock, and 
by two further lines that represent the re-
establishment of public goods at reduced levels. For 
the sake of simplicity, the public goods are depicted as 
fully restored after several stresses prior to the ulti-
mate stress or shock, but other trajectories are possi-
ble: one in which the public goods are eroded over 
time (the line descends); or alternatively where public 
goods are actually enhanced (the line ascends; to be 
shown later). 
4.4. A Closer Look at Resilience Elements  
It is not the aim of this article to produce an ultimate, 
universal definition of resilience, nor to vote for one of 
the existing definitions (and consequently approaches) 
from the wide spectrum between specific application 
areas and the view of Neocleous, who dismissively says 
that resilience is “all and everything”. Nevertheless, in 
order to understand better the notion of resilience in 
general and in the context of surveillance, we need to 
explore its fundamental elements and their reasonable 
spheres of interpretation, and to highlight at least the 
most important aspects of these elements. We focus 
on three such elements: the reference point or nor-
malcy, the time scale in which changes can be meas-
ured, and the role of perception.  
4.4.1. The Reference Point or the State of Normalcy 
As has been shown, resilience is generally understood 
as a “good thing”, an entity’s positive capacity or 
strength that enables it to resist stress and shock or to 
bounce back from the impact. Consequently, stresses 
and shocks are considered in this context as adverse 
impacts or events: “bad things” that degrade the origi-
nal state of the entity. Although in this article we re-
gard resilience as potentially positive, resilience as an 
abstract notion is inherently value-neutral. Every struc-
ture or entity can have the characteristics of being re-
silient towards external or internal impacts. It is rela-
tively easy to identify those states of entities that are 
widely regarded as having positive value, while the 
stresses or shocks to it are seen as negative, and to-
wards which the entity should be resilient. For exam-
ple, most people would regard food safety as a benefi-
cial state of society, and see floods and droughts as 
having adverse impacts. It is regarded as positive if the 
system can mobilise food reserves, thus being resilient 
towards such impacts. Similarly, there is consensus 
that a working electricity, waterworks or telecommuni-
cation infrastructure is a “good thing”. Our war ene-
mies’ resilient infrastructure is regarded as a bad thing 
from the standpoint of our interests. 
Even if we consider resilience from our own per-
spective and interests, in reality most beneficial states 
are not optimal; the ideal state might only be expected 
or imagined. However, it is possible to evaluate chang-
es and resilient responses in relation to these sub-
optimal states, too: in other words, to measure the level 
of resilience in relation to these realistic situations. If a 
country’s food safety is not optimal, but can bounce 
back from even the strongest of shocks to the usual, 
sub-optimal level, it can still be regarded as resilient. 
Society as a whole or the groups that constitute it 
cannot be regarded as homogeneous entities with re-
gard to either the positive or negative nature of the 
state of normalcy or to the positive or negative nature 
of the stresses or shocks, as the example of dictator-
ships showed. For most individuals or social strata a 
strong stress or shock, such as an economic crisis, can 
be adverse, yet for others it could be beneficial. This 
may have a strong impact at a higher level of society, 
too: it may change power relationships and the social 
distribution of goods. In such contexts, the formal or 
informal obligation to be “resilient” may easily be 
abused or at least used in a questionable manner (Slat-
er, 2014). Since we focus on the social implications of 
resilience, we adopt the values (public goods) of west-
ern liberal democracies. But even within this value sys-
tem, the same impact may have both beneficial and 
adverse effects on the same citizens concerned, an ex-
ample of which is the consequences of ubiquitous sur-
veillance in the developed world. 
Finally, the reference point (or reference line in the 
graphical models, below) is not always stationary: it is 
changing, even if change cannot easily be perceived 
because of its slow pace. In addition, the inherent pub-
lic goods—reflected in the written and unwritten 
norms governing the life of a social entity—may also 
change as a result of repeated stresses or shocks. Fig-
ure 6 shows an expanded model of resilience with 
eroding public goods. The vertical axis, “public goods”, 
refers both to the horizontal line that shows the persis-
tence of a good’s desirability (the “ideal”), and to the 
descending line that shows the decline in its reality un-
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der conditions of stress. As our introduction remarks 
about surveillance suggested, this situation is quite re-
alistic in an environment where citizens become resili-
ent towards security threats but gradually lose their 
“reasonable expectation” of privacy, autonomy, or dig-
nity due to increased surveillance.3 
However, it is also possible that repeated stresses 
and shocks result in an enhanced desire for public 
goods, perhaps through an increase in social solidarity, 
institutional organisation, morale, greater awareness, 
or other reinforcing conditions and factors. Thus citi-
                                                          
3 With regard to privacy, the doctrine of “reasonable expecta-
tion”, a complex and legally controverted concept involving 
both normative and empirical dimensions as well as contextual 
understanding of what is “reasonable” in what circumstances 
(Nissenbaum, 2010, pp. 233-236; Solove, 2008, pp. 71-74) is 
closely related to the level of public goods depicted in our dia-
grams, including increases and decreases over time. 
zens may become sensitised to the detrimental social 
side-effects of security measures and increase their 
demands regarding the guarantees of their privacy, 
dignity, autonomy, etc. in such situations (Figure 7). 
Resilience towards security threats may also mask 
adverse changes affecting certain social groups, or con-
serve a social-political situation that is far from ideal 
and prevent it from improving. For example, increased 
social sorting—a possible adverse consequence of 
ubiquitous surveillance (Lyon, 2003a)—may be legiti-
mised by the needs of resilience towards security 
threats and stresses. It is in the face of such challenges 
that societies may seek to affirm the principle that in a 
democratic regime even the positive aspects of resili-
ence should not serve as a means to conserve contra-
dictory social or political constructions or inhibit the 
development of a democratic, rule-of-law society. 
 
Figure 6. Expanded resilience model showing creeping erosion of public goods. 
 
Figure 7. Expanded resilience model showing enhancement of public goods. 
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4.4.2. Time Scale 
The time dimension in the context of resilience is im-
portant from two main perspectives. First, if the inten-
sification of stressful adverse changes is too slow to be 
perceived by social groups or individuals, the impacts 
will hardly be recognisable; thus we can speak about 
non-conscious, “instinctive” resilience only (see also 
the role of perception, below). Second, if the adverse 
impact is shock-like and therefore recognisable, but if 
the bouncing-back (or forward) phase is slow or une-
ven, the effect of resilience cannot be easily recog-
nised. Two types of this second situation can be noted. 
In the first type, the impact is strong, its consequences 
are evident, and the recovery also consists of fast but 
only partial actions; full recovery takes a long period of 
time. The second type can be observed in the case of 
long-lasting emergency situations, such as wars or 
long-term natural disasters. Here the period of stresses 
and shocks lasts long but the recovery phase even 
longer; years may pass until one can conclude that so-
ciety has regained or improved upon its earlier state. 
However, if the original state of the society or enti-
ty will be restored or surpassed only after several 
years, or in the life of a new generation, it is debata-
ble—in general systems terms—whether this can be 
regarded as a new entity, a new chapter in the history 
of the society, or as still part of the resilience capacity 
of the original entity (Braybrooke & Lindblom, 1963). In 
such situations, therefore, it is necessary to identify 
those public goods that, even in a changed environ-
ment, may represent the ideals with regard to which a 
society may be considered resilient. In this respect, a 
post-war country where the economy has been quickly 
restored, coupled with a dictatorial political regime, 
can be regarded as resilient in terms of the economy 
but not in terms of the society or polity, if the country 
had been a pre-war rule-of-law democracy. 
4.4.3. The role of Perception 
Adverse developments and their impacts, especially in 
the case of persistent stresses such as ubiquitous sur-
veillance, may remain unnoticed by those affected. 
When they finally realise the consequences, the mo-
ment for diminishing the impact or developing an al-
ternative strategy may have passed. Such a situation 
may also result in an unnoticed erosion of the “ideal” 
level of desire for public goods, as shown in Figure 8. 
The widely used metaphor of the boiling frog is illus-
trated here and in Figure 9; it refers to the ability or in-
ability of people (or any entity) to recognise and react 
to important adverse changes that occur gradually.4 
The boiling frog metaphor has been suggested before 
in relation to surveillance (Marx, 1987, p. 54), and it 
can also be understood as representing what a former 
UK Information Commissioner once famously termed 
“sleepwalking into a surveillance society” (Ford, 2004). 
The issue of perception may relate to that of time-
scale; for example, adverse changes taking place grad-
ually over a long period of time may be much harder to 
perceive than a similar aggregate change taking place 
over a much shorter time period. 
On the other hand, even in a successfully resilient 
construction, the actors themselves might not be fully 
aware of their own resilience activities. In other words, 
there exist perceived shocks and stresses, and unper-
ceived ones, coupled with conscious resilience options 
and unconscious ones. The possible combinations are 
manifold. In such situations and also on a societal level, 
the observer can identify an important moment: the 
moment of perception (Figure 9). 
                                                          
4 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boiling_frog 
 
Figure 8. Unperceived stresses and eroding public goods. 
 Media and Communication, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 2, Pages 21-41 35 
 
Figure 9. Perceived stresses and chances of resilience. 
This diagram depicts a scenario in which the moment 
of perception prompts action leading to a change of 
real conditions. However, another scenario (not de-
picted) could show a case in which it is not possible to 
change real conditions, so that the moment of percep-
tion leads instead only to an increased desire for an 
“ideal”. This can have special importance in the surveil-
lance domain: surveillance stresses, even shocks, are 
often not perceived by the affected population, not to 
mention the indirect consequences of such impacts. 
For example, until the 2013 Snowden revelations of 
mass surveillance, people in Western societies were 
only dimly aware of, or even oblivious to, the fact that 
they had far less communications privacy than they 
had thought or had reason to expect. The public’s valu-
ation of privacy has arguably increased as a conse-
quence of this new awareness. Aradau (2014, p. 79) 
uses the term “moment of surprise” to describe the 
moment of perception (which may be experienced 
immediately in the case of shocks, or belatedly, as 
here, in the case of incremental stresses). Indeed, she 
argues that resilience approaches have become popu-
lar in policy fields precisely “as a response to the prob-
lem of surprising events” (2014, p. 87). 
5. Resilience in the Surveillance Context 
We have argued that much contemporary surveillance, 
and its effects on public goods, is predicated upon poli-
cies and practices aimed at promoting the security of 
states and societies. In the field of security—which is 
close to our concerns in thinking about surveillance—
“resilience” has tended to be used in the sense of “re-
silience to terrorism/subversion”, and the concepts 
and strategies used are drawn from the lexicon men-
tioned above. Here we propose to explore how similar 
resilience mechanisms might be employed to make so-
cieties more resilient to the more negative conse-
quences of the state and corporate surveillance that is 
undertaken in the name of security. However, in doing 
so, it becomes apparent that certain assumptions of 
the existing resilience models/paradigm must be called 
into question. Developing a resilience framework to in-
corporate different assumptions indicates that various 
outcomes are possible. We conclude that not only does 
this suggest that the use of a resilience strategy in op-
posing greater surveillance should be adopted with on-
ly limited optimism, but that our analysis highlights the 
limits of such resilience in general, including in relation 
to improving security. 
We now take this third step in the modelling of re-
silience, narrowing down from the general and abstract 
to consider specifically resilience to surveillance itself 
as the source of stress. The original Conway et al. 
(2010) model suggests a way of conceptualising differ-
ent strategies to oppose or resist surveillance, namely 
along the broadly temporal sequence of anticipate, 
survey, prevent, tolerate, recover, restore and learn. 
Rather than simply reactively opposing insidious sur-
veillance programmes when they are initially proposed 
or revealed, a “resilience”-based approach suggests 
that, additionally, it would be beneficial in advance to 
prepare a raft both of preventive measures and restor-
ative contingency measures.  
From this perspective, specific measures that could 
be deployed to oppose surveillance can be seen as po-
tentially involving a number of these strategy qualities. 
For example, the establishment of constitutional or 
human rights legal protections are in part anticipatory 
(because they anticipate future governmental attempts 
at their encroachment); in part preventive (because a 
constitutional court might rely on such provisions to 
strike down a proposed new law as unconstitutional); 
restorative (because higher constitutional courts may 
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be acting sometime after a law was originally intro-
duced); and exemplify learning (because jurisprudence 
may develop in the light of new technologies, their ca-
pabilities and implications for citizens). Similarly, citi-
zens’ use of encryption techniques to protect their per-
sonal communications may be anticipatory (of unknown 
future attempts at their interception); preventive (pre-
venting immediate disclosure); restorative (introduced 
specifically to reinstate effective privacy in the light of 
recognition of its former weakness); or demonstrate 
learning (the adoption of even stronger cryptographic 
systems in the light of revealed weaknesses). 
The second respect in which this analysis of resili-
ence potentially informs overall strategies for curtailing 
surveillance is that the area of surveillance itself 
prompts us to question many of the assumptions un-
derpinning conventional models of resilience. As a re-
sult, our analysis suggests that considerable caution is 
warranted and that resilience strategies are no pana-
cea. Snowden’s revelation of mass Internet surveillance 
programmes may present as a sudden major societal 
shock, and be met with resistance or recovery process-
es of certain kinds that could reasonably be character-
ised as “resilience”. However, this surveillance, de-
ployed gradually and stealthily for many years, went 
unnoticed and unchallenged (see Figures 8 and 9). 
Moreover, it remains to be seen whether future gov-
ernmental mass surveillance programmes will success-
fully be constrained, given the temptations they may 
offer, the vested interests in the intelligence communi-
ty, and international as well as national considerations. 
Furthermore, we may also speculate that societal valu-
ing of privacy may have become eroded rather than re-
inforced as a result of the recent disclosures, leading to 
a resigned acceptance of the impossibility of truly pri-
vate personal communications in the digital age. 
The diagrams below illustrate, in a unified struc-
ture, both security- and surveillance-related stresses, 
as well as resilience responses towards them. Figure 10 
shows the adverse impacts and the resilience respons-
es reflecting the traditional trade-off model between 
security and privacy: the trajectories of these two pub-
lic goods are shown within the diagram. This model 
presupposes that, with regard to their privacy implica-
tions, citizens evaluate the introduction and use of se-
curity/surveillance technologies in terms of a trade-off; 
in other words, they regard such situations as a zero-
sum game: more security equals less privacy and vice-
versa. This popular hypothesis implies that, under 
threats to security, security will trump privacy. The dia-
gram also shows the presupposition that surveillance 
measures are natural consequences of terror and other 
threats to security, thereby representing stresses of 
their own, too, in a chain-like pattern. 
Recent research challenges the universal validity of 
this trade-off model and criticises its use in legitimising 
the introduction of privacy-invasive security technolo-
gies. Empirical studies investigating people's percep-
tion and attitudes in this area indicate that people re-
gard security and privacy as two separate public goods, 
and that they want both simultaneously.5 In such a 
model both remain unchanged during stresses and 
shocks of both types; in an ideal situation, as a result of 
resilience responses towards both types of stress, the 
real situation remains unchanged as well (Figure 11). 
                                                          
5 Most significantly the PRISMS project, (The PRIvacy and Secu-
rity MirrorS): “Towards a European Framework for Integrated 
Decision-Making”, Project No. 285399, 7th Framework Pro-
gramme of the European Commission. 
 
Figure 10. Terror threats and surveillance stresses in a security/privacy trade-off model. 
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Figure 11. Terror threats and surveillance stresses in a separate public goods model (ideal situation).  
 
Figure 12. Terror threats and surveillance stresses in a separate public goods model (observed situation). 
However, even if the society or a substructure is resili-
ent towards security threats and shocks and bounces 
back to the original state of normalcy, this may not be 
reflected in the context of surveillance: the negative 
consequences of surveillance—such as increased social 
sorting, detrimental effects upon the social capital of 
interpersonal trust and social solidarity, or the erosion 
of privacy—result in worsening the summation (Σ) of 
the two components of the real situation, as illustrated 
in Figure 12. This figure usefully helps visualise that the 
public goods of security and privacy may indeed con-
tinue to be held in high esteem, but that this may 
nonetheless mask the gradual erosion in the real situa-
tion of citizens” enjoyment of these public goods. 
6. Conclusion 
There are a number of benefits of creating a general 
framework for the modelling of resilience, both in or-
der to understand better the capabilities and limits of 
resilience approaches in general, and in order to model 
the threats posed by surveillance in particular. First, it 
helps both to organise existing knowledge, and to indi-
cate gaps; second, it shows the relationship between, 
and ways of integrating, different resilience instru-
ments; and third, the model can be applied at many 
different levels, from the local to the global. Such 
models consist of concepts that together describe, ab-
stractly and schematically, what it means to be resilient 
in a host of specific contexts and applications. We have 
focused upon one context: surveillance for the purpose 
of (national) security. 
It could be argued that elements of a strategy of re-
silience in the face of threats posed by surveillance are 
already to be found. Civil liberties and Internet privacy 
groups regularly campaign against government pro-
 Media and Communication, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 2, Pages 21-41 38 
posals for new legislation introducing surveillance 
measures, which we could understand as “resistance” 
activities. Many countries afford protections to their 
citizens in respect of fundamental rights, whether by 
means of constitutional provisions, international trea-
ty obligations, privacy laws and other instruments 
(Bennett & Raab, 2006), which could be understood 
as, in large part, an anticipatory or preventive resili-
ence strategy against possible future governmental 
attempts at their erosion. 
Our argument here is that, in two respects, at-
tending to the notion of resilience is useful in under-
standing the prospect of societal “pushback” in the 
face of greater surveillance. The first is that it poten-
tially offers surveillance activists a framework for de-
veloping a wider range of measures and tactics for 
opposing surveillance. However, second, and more di-
rectly the focus of the present article, is that while 
the notion of resilience brings with it a consideration 
of anticipatory, immediate and future responses, it 
encompasses an unspecified and hence ambiguous 
time-frame of analysis, which could various refer to 
the short term, medium term, and even perhaps ap-
proach the longue durée. This is why the horizontal 
axis of the diagrams, and the vertical axis for that 
matter, are not calibrated to show intervals or magni-
tudes. Beyond the weeks, months, or few years in 
which we are accustomed to reckon the span of 
events, the unfolding of resilience—including the hab-
its, outlooks, myths and stories, and institutional 
changes—that takes place in societies and cultures 
may follow a trajectory that encompasses many gen-
erations: historical time, not journalistic time.  
The terminology of resilience has tended to be as-
sociated with strategies to enhance security, including 
the possible deployment of further state-surveillance 
measures. As a consequence, “resilience” as a con-
cept has tended to be viewed as associated with secu-
ritisation processes evaluated as “good”. However, 
this article has argued that, in the abstract at least, 
resilience can be regarded as neutral, and that its 
evaluation is a consequence of its application. More-
over, since “resilience” is an umbrella concept gather-
ing together a range of measures designed to thwart 
an undesirable challenge or to remedy its effects, it 
offers a way of unifying such individual measures into 
a coherent strategy. Since it both suggests a concrete 
framework for developing policy and describes a de-
sired on-going quality of a successful scenario, a re-
purposed application of the concept suggests ways in 
which democratic societies might become more resil-
ient to the threats posed by surveillance itself. 
This perspective is particularly useful in helping to 
understand different societal responses in the face of 
attempts at surveillance expansionism over time. This 
is because it enables us to model and explore differ-
ent scenarios and outcomes—still, of course, to be 
elaborated and then tested empirically—including 
those in which surveillance measures expand to the 
detriment of public goods, and hence in which resili-
ence to surveillance may be said to have failed. As 
such, and unlike many previous models of resilience, 
the models presented here do not assume resilience 
strategies always to prove successful. The diagram-
matic representation of resilience prepared by Con-
way et al. (2010) represents a significant advance 
over the “optimistic” versions of resilience policy of-
ten informing resilience strategies, insofar as it 
acknowledges the possibility of negative outcomes (a 
“failure” of a system to prove itself “resilient”). How-
ever, the diagram is ambiguous as to whether it rep-
resents a normative goal or a description of a state of 
affairs. By separating these two qualities, we have 
been able to offer different scenarios involving inter-
actions (but also divergences) between the two. As 
well as offering a cautionary note as to the likelihood 
of success of resilience-based strategies in opposing 
surveillance, an implication of the analysis presented 
here is that governments and authorities should be 
similarly circumspect regarding the efficacy of coun-
ter-terrorist and other state security resilience strate-
gies, including the imposition of surveillance, since 
the same limitations apply. 
Crucially, this article has contended that whilst 
surveillance strategies may (ironically) be deployed by 
societies in the name of greater “security”, surveil-
lance measures may have significant long-term detri-
mental consequences for constitutive public goods 
such as privacy, and hence be detrimental to society 
more generally. Whereas it has long been noted with-
in surveillance studies that surveillance may produce 
a “chilling effect” on social and political debate, our 
analysis has identified more long-term, but no less in-
sidious, consequences of increased surveillance of cit-
izens, and this has to be taken into consideration in 
the fields of security studies and resilience studies 
alike. 
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